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Abstract: Beyond the effect of a judgment of the court of the seat setting aside the award, 
the relationship between a challenge of the award at the seat and enforcement under 
Article V of the New York Convention is unclear as is the relationship between two or 
more sets of enforcement proceedings in different jurisdictions. This article explores 
whether a judgment rejecting a challenge of the award at the seat of the arbitration or 
granting or refusing enforcement gives rise to an estoppel in further enforcement 
proceedings. This would preclude the party opposing enforcement from re-litigating 
issues that have been decided in the previous judgment as well as issues that could have 
been raised, and ultimately decided, in the previous proceedings. Furthermore, this article 
examines whether a party who does not challenge an arbitral award at the seat of the 
arbitration or does not oppose an application for enforcement of the award can raise, in 
further enforcement proceedings, a defense that could have been a ground for challenging 
the award at the seat or opposing its enforcement in previous proceedings. Broadly, the 
answer to these questions has been that a judgment rejecting a challenge of the award at 
the seat or granting or refusing its enforcement does not prevent the unsuccessful party 
from opposing the enforcement of the award in a foreign country and that the 
unsuccessful party can elect whether to challenge the award at the seat or to wait and 
raise any ground of invalidity of the award in enforcement proceedings. This article 
challenges this general assumption and demonstrates how the doctrines of issue estoppel 
and abuse of process may prevent a party from opposing enforcement on grounds that 
have been, or could have been, raised at the seat of the arbitration or in previous 
enforcement proceedings. Consistency and finality are well served by a structured and 







	 	 	 	 	







An often unexplored problem in international commercial arbitration is the relationship 
between the remedies against the award at the seat of the arbitration and enforcement 
proceedings. This relationship is governed by the New York Convention of 1958 in 
Article V(1)(e), which provides that recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award may be refused if the party against whom they are invoked proves that the award 
has been suspended or set aside by a competent authority in the country in which, or 
under the law of which, the award was made.1 Plainly, this provision only deals with the 
case in which the unsuccessful party in the arbitration obtains, at the seat of the 
arbitration, a favorable judgment by a court of supervisory jurisdiction. There is nothing, 
in Article V or in the New York Convention more generally, which applies to the case in 
which a challenge to the arbitral award was dismissed or no challenge was made at all at 
the seat of the arbitration and the unsuccessful party raises a defense that it had raised, or 
could have raised, before the courts of the seat.2 And yet, this situation arises very 
frequently, indeed probably much more often than the setting aside of the award in the 
jurisdiction of the seat being pleaded as a defense to enforcement. The received wisdom, 
																																																								
1 In this article, it is assumed that “the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made” is 
the country of the seat of the arbitration. The New York Convention appears to leave to the Contracting 
States the definition of the criteria that determine where, or under which law, the award was made and 
more and more States adopt the seat as the main criterion for the localization of the arbitral proceedings: 
see Klaus Peter Berger, Re-examining the Arbitration Agreement: Applicable Law – Consensus or 
Confusion? in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK TO BASICS? 301, 315 (ICCA Congress Series, 
No. 13, 2007); Piero Bernardini, Arbitration Clauses: Achieving Effectiveness in the Law Applicable to the 
Arbitration Clause in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS 
OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 197–203 (Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), ICCA Congress 
Series, No. 9, 1998); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Identifying and Applying the Law Governing the 
Arbitration Procedure – The Role of the Law of the Place of Arbitration in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
338–343 (ICCA Congress Series No. 9, 1999); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND 
PRACTICE 307–309 (Kluwer Law Arbitration 2012). 
2 The problem in question is not limited to the relationship between remedies at the seat of the arbitration 
and enforcement proceedings. Remedies against the award at the seat of the arbitration can be considered as 
the most important manifestation of the supervisory or supportive jurisdiction of the courts over the 
arbitration but they are not the only one. A court may, for instance, rule on the validity of the arbitration 
agreement under Article II of the New York Convention, if one party brings proceedings in court in breach 
of the arbitration agreement, or on the proper constitution of the arbitration tribunal on an application for 
the appointment of an arbitrator. This article is, however, limited to the relationship between remedies 
against the award at the seat of the arbitration and enforcement proceedings under the New York 
Convention and to the relationship between two or more sets of enforcement proceedings. In principle, the 
conclusions reached in respect of the relationship between two or more sets of enforcement proceedings 
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pretty much unchallenged so far, is that a judgment rejecting a challenge against the 
award at the seat of arbitration does not bind the court of the place of enforcement.3 A 
fortiori, a party who does not challenge the award at the seat can plead, under Article V 
of the New York Convention, issues that it could have raised before the courts of the 
seat.4 The consequence is that, in enforcement proceedings, the unsuccessful party can re-
argue issues already litigated at the seat and litigate for the first time any issue that it did 
not raise before the courts of the seat either because the challenge was of a more limited 
scope or because there was no challenge at all. Similarly, the relationship between two or 
more sets of enforcement proceedings under Article V of the Convention is unexplored 
and there is a view that the unsuccessful party may oppose the enforcement of the award 
on grounds that he did not raise, or that have been rejected, in previous enforcement 
proceedings. This article will argue that the New York Convention allows for a different 
solution, which is left to the law of the enforcement State, and that, in certain 
circumstances, a party should not be allowed to re-litigate issues that have already been 
litigated, or could have been litigated, in previous setting aside or enforcement 
proceedings.  
 
This article is structured as follows. Firstly, it challenges the traditional approach to the 
relationship between the remedies at the seat and enforcement proceedings and 
demonstrates that such an approach is neither required under the New York Convention 
nor necessarily desirable as a matter of policy. Secondly, it discusses the application of 
the doctrine of issue estoppel5 in the relationship between setting aside proceedings at the 
seat and enforcement proceedings. Thirdly, it examines the application of the broader 
doctrine of abuse of process6 also in the relationship between setting aside proceedings at 
the seat and enforcement proceedings. Fourthly, it analyzes the application of the 
doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process in the relationship between two or more 
																																																								
3 Maxi Scherer, Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the “Judgment 
Route” the Wrong Road? 4 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 587, 603–604 (2013) 
(U.K.), citing ABCI v. Banque Franco–Tunisienne (2002) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 511 (QB) (Eng. and Wales).  
4 Dirk Otto & Omaia Elwan, Article V(2), in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 407–409 (Herbert Kronke et al. 
(eds.), Kluwer Law International 2010). Matthias Scherer and Sam Moss, Resisting Enforcement of a 
Foreign Arbitral Award under the New York Convention, 51 INTER-PACIFIC BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 
17 (2008) and David Howell, Issue Estoppel Arising out of Foreign Interlocutory Court Proceedings in 
International Arbitration, 20 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 153, 164–166 (2003). See, e.g., 
Hong Kong: Paklito Ltd v. Klockner East Asia Ltd (1993) 2 HKLR 39; Hebei Import & Export 
Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. COMM ARB 652 (Court of Final 
Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region): Germany: Not indicated v. Not indicated, 
Oberlandesgericht, (2006) 31 Y.B. COMM ARB 652; Manufacturer (Netherlands) v. Buyer (Germany), 
Oberlandesgericht, Frankfurt am Main, 26 Sch 28/05, 26 June 2006, (2007) 32 Y.B. COMM ARB 351; 
French Seller v. German Buyer, Oberlandesgericht, Munich, 23 November 2009 and Bundesgerichtshof, 
Third Civil Chamber, 16 December 2010 (16 December 2010/Bundesgerichtshof/III ZB 100/09) (2011) 36 
Y.B. COMM ARB 273. 
5 PETER BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 134–137 (Oxford University Press 
2001). V.V. Veeder, Issue Estoppel Reasons for Awards and Transnational Arbitration, in 14 ICC 
BULLETIN, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT 73, 74–75 (2003). 
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sets of enforcement proceedings. Fifthly, it considers corrective mechanisms that courts 
can use, in certain circumstances, to allow a party to re-litigate an issue that would 
otherwise be precluded. Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
B. The traditional approach and its criticism  
 
In international arbitration, it is well established that the courts of the State of the seat of 
the arbitration have supervisory jurisdiction over the award. This supervisory jurisdiction 
concerns, in particular, the remedies against the award available under national 
arbitration legislation. These remedies generally comprise an application for setting aside 
the award on grounds that include, although they are not necessarily limited to, the 
grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement of the award under Article V(1)(a)–(c) 
and (2) of the New York Convention.7  
 
Given this general framework, if the view is taken that a judgment dismissing a challenge 
at the seat or failure to challenge the award at all or a judgment granting the enforcement 
of the award or failure to oppose enforcement of the award at all has no effect in further 
enforcement proceedings, the unsuccessful party in the arbitration will have a choice as to 
the forum in which to challenge the award: it can either challenge the award at the seat or 
it can wait until the successful party seeks enforcement abroad. Furthermore, the 
unsuccessful party has two, or more, opportunities to challenge an award: it can challenge 
the award at the seat and, if unsuccessful, it can raise the same issue time and again in 
enforcement proceedings in any jurisdiction in which enforcement is sought without 
being bound by the outcome of the previous setting aside or enforcement proceedings.  
 
This position is not fully satisfactory. Finality is an important value in international 
arbitration and to give the unsuccessful party the opportunity to litigate the same issue 
time and again around the world does not appear to be in line with this fundamental 
objective.8 Furthermore, there seems to be no principled reason to allow a party to do so, 
																																																								
7 A perfect match between the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement under the New York 
Convention and the grounds for setting aside the award is achieved under the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”). The grounds on which a court may set aside an 
award under Article 34(2) of the Model Law correspond to the grounds on which a court may refuse to 
recognize and enforce an award under Article 36(1)(a)(i)–(iv) and (b)(i)–(ii). The only additional ground 
for refusing to recognize and enforce an award is the suspension or setting aside of the award in the country 
of origin under Article 36(1)(a)(v), which clearly does not apply in proceedings for setting aside an award 
at the seat. In other legal systems this correspondence may not be complete but still remedies against the 
award at the seat generally include the grounds on which enforcement may be refused under Article V of 
the New York Convention. This is the case, for instance, in Article 190(2) of the Swiss Federal Private 
International Law Act of 18 December 1987, sections 67, 68 and 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, 
and sections 10 and 11(b) of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act. 
8 This view appears to be receiving support from senior judges around the world, speaking extra-judicially. 
For example, Lord Mance has suggested that in today’s internationalized legal order, we need “greater 
coordination and coherence between different legal systems – more, rather than less, mutual recognition 
and enforcement of each other’s decisions”: Lord Mance, Arbitration – a Law unto Itself?, 30th Annual 
Lecture organized by The School of International Arbitration and Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (4 
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or at least not without qualification. If the unsuccessful party had a full opportunity to 
litigate an issue in a fair trial before an impartial court of competent jurisdiction, re-
litigating or re-opening the issue does not serve the ends of justice. Justice has been done 
or could have been done already and finality ought to prevail, in the interest of the other 
party and in the public interest.  
 
Two objections can be raised against this reasoning. The first is purely doctrinal. The 
New York Convention allows the unsuccessful party to re-litigate, under Article V, issues 
that have already been litigated at the seat of the arbitration or in previous enforcement 
proceedings.9 This objection, however, would not be well founded. Article V of the New 
York Convention is a maximum rule not a minimum rule.10 This means that Article V 
sets out the only grounds on which recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral 
award may be refused but does not compel the courts of a Contracting State to refuse 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign award if one of the grounds in Article V is 
established. The language of Article V(1) and (2) is clear in providing that recognition 
and enforcement “may” be refused. Therefore, if one of the grounds under Article V of 
the New York Convention is established, the court has the power, or is permitted, to 
refuse recognition and enforcement but is not required to do so.11 Thus, the court may, in 
																																																																																																																																																																					
November 2015) 1, 14. Along the same lines, the Chief Justice of Singapore The Hon The Chief Justice 
Sundaresh Menon has argued that “[r]ecognising issue estoppel in this context seems eminently sensible, 
both from the perspective of harmonising the treatment of awards and perhaps even more importantly, the 
overarching public policy of finality”: The Hon The Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, Patron’s Address, 81 
ARBITRATION 413, 424 (2015) (U.K.). 
9 This philosophy is expressed, for example, in PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV 
and others [2013] SGCA 57, para 67, where the Singapore Court of Appeal relied on the statement by Lord 
Mance in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government 
of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46, [2011] 1 AC 763, para 28 that Article VI of the New York Convention and 
section 103(5) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 do not contain “any suggestion that a person resisting 
recognition or enforcement in one country has any obligation to seek to set aside the award in the other 
country where the ward was made”. In the statement in question, Lord Mance was commenting on whether 
a party that objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal could raise the objection afresh in enforcement 
proceedings even if he had not challenged the award at the seat. As will be explained later, Lord Mance 
was not excluding the possibility that a party could be precluded from re-litigating issues that had been 
already litigated before the courts of the seat.  
10 ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 265 (Asser 1981). Patricia Nacimiento, Article V(1)(a), in RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION 208–209 (Herbert Kronke et al. (eds.), Kluwer Law International 2010); JULIAN D.M. LEW, 
LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 445 
(Kluwer Law International 2003); GARY B BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 380 
(Kluwer Law International 2012). 
11 This proposition is still controversial: see, denying that Art V may be construed as giving the court a 
discretion not to enforce the award, Philippe Fouchard, La portée internationale de l’annulation de la 
sentence arbitrale dans son pays d’origine REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 344 [1997] (Fr.); JULIAN D.M. LEW, 
LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 706 
(Kluwer Law International 2003). However, the better view is that Art V is permissive and not mandatory: 
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, 265 (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation 1981); Jan Paulsson, May or Must Under the New York Convention: An Exercise if Syntax and 
Linguistics, 14 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 227 (1998) (U.K.); William Park, Duty and Discretion in 
Forthcoming	in	the	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	
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its discretion, decide to enforce the award if one of the grounds under Article V is 
established. Furthermore, Article VII of the New York Convention stipulates that the 
provisions of the Convention do not deprive any interested party of the right to avail itself 
of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law of the country in 
which recognition and enforcement are sought. Therefore, rules of national law that are 
more favorable to the recognition and enforcement of the award remain fully applicable, 
which means that a court in enforcement proceedings may still recognize and enforce a 
foreign arbitral award even if a ground under Article V is established, provided that 
national law allows the court to do so.12 
 
This interpretation of the New York Convention has been endorsed by the English courts, 
albeit with some hesitation. In Yukos Oil Co v. Dardana Ltd, Mance LJ, as he then was, 
commented that “[t]he use of the word ‘may’ must have been intended to cater for the 
possibility that, despite the original existence of one or more of the listed circumstances, 
the right to rely on them had been lost, by for example another agreement or estoppel”.13 
Lord Mance JSC in Dallah Real Estate confirmed this approach and explained that the 
use of the word “may” must have been intended “to enable the court to consider other 
circumstances, which might on some recognizable legal principle affect the prima facie 
right to have enforcement or recognition refused”.14 His Lordship went on to comment 
that Article V of the New York Convention “covers a wide spectrum of potential 
objections to enforcement or recognition, in relation to some of which it might be easier 
to invoke such discretion as the word “may” contains than it could be in any case where 
the objection is that there was never any applicable arbitration agreement between the 
parties to the award”.15 Lord Collins JSC framed the discretion in somewhat broader 
terms: “the court before which recognition or enforcement is sought has a discretion to 
recognize or enforce even if the party resisting recognition or enforcement has proved 
																																																																																																																																																																					
International Arbitration, 93 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 805 (1999) and Nadia 
Darwazeh, Article V(1)(e), in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A 
GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 308–310 (Herbert Kronke et al. (eds.), Kluwer 
Law International 2010). 
12  Emmanuel Gaillard, The Relationship of the New York Convention with Other Treaties and with 
Domestic Law, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 
69 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro (eds.), Cameron May 2009); Dirk Otto, Article VII, in 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION 448–449 (Herbert Kronke et al. (eds.), Kluwer Law International 2010); FOUCHARD 
GAILLARD AND GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 134–138 (Emmanuel Gaillard 
& John Savage (eds.), Kluwer Law International 1999). See, for example, France: Société Pablak Ticaret 
Limited Sirketi v. Norsolor SA (9 October 1984) Cour de Cassation (1986) 11 Y.B. COMM ARB 484; Polish 
Ocean Line v. Jolasry (10 March 1993) Cour de Cassation (1994) 19 Y.B. COMM ARB 663; Hilmarton Ltd 
v. Omnium de Traitement et de Valorisation-OTV (1995) 20 Y.B. COMM ARB 665; Kompas Overseas Inc 
v. OAO Severnoe Rechnoe Parokhodstvo (Northern River Shipping Company), Provisions Judge of the 
District Court of Amsterdam, 482043/KG RK 11–362, 10 May 2012, (2012) 37 Y.B. COMM ARB 279–280. 
13 Yukos Oil Co v. Dardana Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 543, [2002] CLC 1120, para 8, per Mance LJ.  
14 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; [2011] 1 AC 763, para 67. 
15 Id. para 68.  
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that there was no valid arbitration agreement”.16 However, his Lordship went on to agree 
with Lord Mance JSC in that the discretion was not arbitrary but there had to be some 
recognizable legal principle on which the discretion could be exercised. He also agreed 
with Lord Mance JSC that one such principle was when the party resisting enforcement 
was estopped from challenging the validity of the award.17 However, in Lord Collins’ 
opinion, the grounds on which the discretion could be exercised were broader and 
included, for example, a case in which English law would refuse to apply a foreign 
national law which makes the arbitration agreement invalid.18 
 
Other jurisdictions have also recognized this discretion under the New York Convention. 
In Hong Kong, the position was explained in the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal 
in Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited.19 In 
considering whether to refuse enforcement, the Court stated: “the use of the word ‘may’ 
in [Arbitration Ordinance] s 44 and Article V of the Convention enables the enforcing 
court to enforce an award, notwithstanding that a s 44 ground might otherwise be 
established. Whether a court would so act in such a case would depend in very large 
measure on the particular circumstances.”20 In an earlier High Court case, Kaplan J noted 
that he could “envisage circumstances” where this discretion would be exercised, such as 
where the procedural irregularity asserted would have made no difference to the outcome 
of the dispute. 21  In the United States, this discretionary standard was recognized in 
Chromalloy v. Egypt.22 In that case, an award had been set aside at the seat of arbitration. 
The District Judge considered that the discretionary standard of Article V should and 
could be read in tandem with Article VII of the Convention. As such, the court 
considered the issue of enforcement as a matter of U.S. federal law and concluded that 
there were no grounds, under U.S. federal law, to refuse the enforcement of the award. 
The Court further held that recognizing the decision of the Egyptian court would violate 
the U.S. public policy in favor of the enforcement of arbitral awards.23  
																																																								
16 Id. para 126.  
17 Id. para 127.  
18 Id. para 128.  
19 Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. COMM 
ARB 652 (Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). 
20 Id. para 52. 
21 Paklito Investment Ltd v. Klockner East Asia Ltd (1993) 2 HKLR 39, paras 46–48.  
22 Matter of Chromalloy Aeroservices (Arab Republic) 939 F Supp 907 (DDC 1996). 
23  That said, the bounds of the discretion have subsequently been narrowed in TermoRio SA ESP 
(Colombia) v. Electranta SP (Colombia) 487 F 3d 928 (2007). In that case, the court was similarly faced 
with the question of whether to enforce an award which had been set aside at the seat of arbitration. In 
contrast with Chromalloy, the court forcefully stated that “it takes much more than a mere assertion that the 
judgment of the primary State ‘[o]ffends the public policy’ of the secondary State to overcome a defence 
raised under Article V(1)(e)”. As such, the court declined to exercise its discretion. More recently see 
Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S De R L de CV v. Pemex-Exploración y Producción, 
No 10 Civ 206 (AKH), 2013 WL 4517225, (SDNY Aug 27 2013). However, one thing is to recognize that 
there is a discretion, quite another is to define the boundaries of such a discretion. There is little doubt that 
the U.S. courts do accept that Art V of the New York Convention sets out a discretionary standard to be 
read together with Art VII of the Convention. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the enforcement of 
Forthcoming	in	the	American	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	
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In civil law jurisdictions, where the legal system is somewhat less accustomed to 
recognizing courts broad discretions to be exercised judicially, the same result may be 
achieved relying exclusively on Article VII of the Convention. In France, the courts have 
relied on Article VII of the Convention rather than on the discretionary standard in 
Article V to enforce awards notwithstanding one of the grounds for refusing enforcement 
under Article V was established.24 In the Putrabali decision, for instance, an award which 
had been set aside at the seat in London was enforced in France. Although a ground 
under Article V of the New York Convention was proven, the Cour de Cassation stated 
that “pursuant to Article VII of the New York Convention [the claimant]’s request in 
France for recognition was admissible and it could rely on the French rules of 
international arbitration which do not include a foreign setting aside of the award among 
the cases of denial of recognition.”25 German courts also rely on Article VII to provide 
for a restrictive interpretation of the grounds under Article V of the Convention and, 
therefore, enforce awards even if a ground for refusal would appear to have been 
established on a wider interpretation of ground in question. The German Federal Supreme 
Court held that “the New York Convention – either as an international convention or as 
the law referred to by Sect 1061 ZPO – does not prevent the German courts from 
applying the grounds for refusal of recognition restrictively. The New York Convention 
does not hinder recognition-friendly practice of the national law (Art VII(1) New York 
Convention). Courts remain free as before to interpret national law restrictively 
[teleologische Reduktion].”26 
 
The above analysis shows that there is already wide support for the proposition that 
Article V provides courts with discretion to enforce an award even where a ground for 
refusal has been made out. Alternatively, courts rely on more favorable domestic laws 
under Article VII to enforce awards notwithstanding a ground for refusal under Article V. 
And more favorable national provisions under Article VII are capable of informing the 
exercise of discretion under Article V: the discretionary standard in Article V allows for 
the enforcement of awards notwithstanding a ground for refusal is established and Article 
VII provides for a gateway through which the discretion can be exercised on some 
recognizable principle of domestic law.  
 
The second argument in support of the mainstream view that allows a party to re-litigate 
or re-open, at the enforcement stage, issues that were, or could have been, litigated at the 
seat of the arbitration or in previous enforcement proceedings is policy-based: sovereign 
																																																																																																																																																																					
annulled awards see Rishabh Jogani, The Role of National Courts in the Post-arbitral Process: The 
Possible Issues with Enforcement of a Set-aside Award, 81 ARBITRATION 254 (2015) (U.K.). 
24 This is possibly because of the less permissive, and more ambiguous, language in the French text of the 
New York Convention, which states that recognition and enforcement will not be refused (ne seront 
refusées) unless one of the listed grounds is shown. 
25 Société PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Société Rena Holding et Société Mnogutia Est Epices [2007] Revue 
de l’Arbitrage 507, para 11.94 (Fr.).  
26 H v. F in liquidation, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 4 January 2012, 9 Sch 02/ 09 and Bundesgerichtshof, 
III ZB 8/12, 20 December 2012, (2013) 38 Y.B. COMM ARB 379, para 4.  
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States reserve to themselves a certain degree of control over foreign arbitral awards 
without which they are not prepared to recognize and enforce such awards within their 
territories.27 Therefore, it is irrelevant that certain issues have been determined by a 
foreign court. They can be re-argued before the enforcement court not to protect the 
interests of the party opposing recognition and enforcement but to protect the interests of 
the enforcement State. This reasoning is correct in identifying the rationale for Article V. 
Article V is the maximum degree of control over foreign arbitral awards that Contracting 
States have reserved to themselves in the exercise of their sovereignty. However, 
precisely because of this function of Article V to protect the interests of the enforcement 
State, the enforcement State may choose to exercise a lower degree of scrutiny. The New 
York Convention allows it to do so both in Article V, which permits but does not require 
the court to refuse recognition and enforcement if a ground set out therein is established, 
and in Article VII, which allows Contracting States to apply national provisions that are 
more favorable to the recognition and enforcement of the award.  
 
If Article V protects the interest of the enforcing State, it follows that States can apply a 
sliding scale approach in giving effect to foreign judgments precluding a party from 
raising a ground for opposing enforcement under Article V of the Convention depending 
on the degree of public interest involved.28 This is clear if one considers that not all 
grounds under Article V have the same value as means of protecting the interests of the 
enforcing State. Thus, public policy under Article V(2)(b) is the strongest expression of a 
State’s sovereignty and it is highly unlikely, if not logically impossible, that issues of 
public policy in State A can be adjudicated upon in State B with binding effect in State A. 
In Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co, the Court of Appeal held that a Dutch 
judgment refusing to recognize a Russian judgment setting aside an arbitral award as 
contrary to public policy did not give rise to an issue estoppel in England because English 
public policy was not the same as Dutch public policy.29 On the other hand, issues of 
procedure under Article V(1)(b) and (d) appear to have as their predominant function the 
protection of individual interests, which may be safeguarded in any court of competent 
jurisdiction around the world. Therefore, there is much less of a problem for State A to 
give effect to a judgment in State B on whether the arbitral proceedings were conducted 
in breach of the unsuccessful party’s procedural rights. A clear example of this approach 
may be found in the English judgment of Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd.30 
In that case, the courts of the seat of the arbitration had rejected a challenge of the award 
by the defendant on the ground of procedural irregularity. The defendant then sought to 
rely on the same ground in England to resist recognition and enforcement of the award. 
Colman J held that when the party resisting enforcement had applied for a remedy against 
																																																								
27 See, e.g., Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. 
COMM ARB 652 (Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), paras 42–44 
(especially the last sentence of para 43), per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.  
28 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; [2011] 1 AC 763, para 68, per Lord Mance (Eng. and Wales).  
29 Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co [2012] EWCA Civ 855, [2012] 2 CLC 549 (Eng. and 
Wales).  
30 Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] CLC 647 (QB) (Eng. and Wales). 
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the award on the ground of a procedural defect before the court of supervisory 
jurisdiction and that remedy had been refused, “it will […] normally be a very strong 
policy consideration before the English courts that it has been conclusively determined by 
the courts of the agreed supervisory jurisdiction that the award should stand”.31 
 
This sliding scale approach has been adopted, albeit implicitly and tentatively, by the 
courts of Hong Kong. In Paklito Ltd v. Klockner East Asia Ltd, the argument was 
advanced that “if a court were satisfied that it would be contrary to the public policy of 
Hong Kong to enforce an award” or that the arbitration agreement was invalid under its 
applicable law, it would be inconceivable that the court’s discretion would be exercised 
notwithstanding but that the court’s discretion could be exercised if the ground pleaded 
was procedural irregularity.32 Kaplan J stated that, in relation to procedural challenges, he 
“could envisage circumstances where the court might exercise its discretion, having 
found the ground established, if the court were to conclude, having seen the new material 
which the defendant wished to put forward, that it would not affect the outcome of the 
dispute.”33 This was expressly accepted in the later Heibei case, where Sir Anthony 
Mason NPJ said that a failure to raise a public policy ground in earlier proceedings 
cannot preclude a party from resisting on that ground the enforcement of the award in 
another jurisdiction because each jurisdiction has its own public policy34 but then went on 
to say that this did “not exclude the possibility that a party may be precluded by his 
failure to raise a point before the court of supervisory jurisdiction from raising that point 
before the court of enforcement”.35  
 
In conclusion, the unqualified possibility for the unsuccessful party to oppose recognition 
and enforcement of an arbitral award on grounds that it raised, or could have raised, at the 
seat of the arbitration or in previous enforcement proceedings is not a requirement under 
the New York Convention. Courts around the world do rely on the discretionary standard 
in Article V and on the application of more favorable national provisions under Article 
VII to enforce awards notwithstanding a ground under Article V is or can be established. 
In doing so, they may apply a sliding scale approach that differentiates between the 
different grounds under Article V. In exercising their discretion under Article V or in 
applying more favorable national provisions under Article VII, courts may turn to 
recognizable domestic principles such as the doctrine of res judicata,36 in its strand of 
issue estoppel, and the doctrine of abuse of process.  
																																																								
31 Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] CLC 647, 661 (QB) (Eng. and Wales); Gujarat 
NRE Coke Limited v. Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 109, paras 64–66, where the Australian 
Federal Court of Appeal expressly endorsed these dicta. 
32 Paklito Investment Ltd v. Klockner East Asia Ltd [1993] 2 HKLR 39, paras 46–48 (H.K.). 
33 Id. para 48.  
34 Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. COMM 
ARB 652, para 46, per Sir Anthony Mason NPJ.  
35 Id. para 47.  
36  Peter Barnett, The Prevention of Abusive Cross-border Re-litigation, INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 943, 943–945 (2002) (U.K.); NEIL ANDREWS, THE THREE PATHS OF 
JUSTICE: COURT PROCEEDINGS, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN ENGLAND 115–118 (Springer, 2012); 
BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS 
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C. Res Judicata and Issue Estoppel  
 
The doctrine of res judicata refers to the final and binding effect of a judicial (or arbitral) 
decision on the parties, their privies and successors in title.37 It has two strands: cause of 
action estoppel38 and issue estoppel.39 
 
Cause of action estoppel prevents the parties, their privies or successors in title from 
pursuing the same cause of action or claim in subsequent proceedings (“cause of action 
estoppel”).40 As a consequence, it is unlikely that this preclusion will ever be directly 
relevant in enforcement proceedings under the New York Convention. Generally, the 
cause of action in enforcement proceedings is a claim to the enforcement of the award, 
which is presumed to be valid, whereas the cause of action in setting aside proceedings is 
																																																																																																																																																																					
ACTIONS 239–241 (Kluwer Law International 2006). For a comparative approach to the application of the 
doctrine in civil law and common law countries, see Filip de Ly & Audley Sheppard, ILA Interim Report 
on Res Judicata and Arbitration, 25(1) ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 35 (2009) (U.K.) and ILA Final 
Report on Res Judicata and Arbitration, 25(1) ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 67 (2009) (U.K.). 
37 SPENCER BOWER, TURNER & HANDLEY, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA (4th ed., LexisNexis 2009); 
PETER BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 8–9 (Oxford University Press 2001); 
NEIL ANDREWS, MODERN CIVIL PROCESS: JUDICIAL AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
ENGLAND 157–158 (Mohr Siebeck 2008). The principle has been recognized as an established element of 
international law by international courts and tribunals: South West Africa Case (1966) I.C.J. Rep. 4, 240; 
Also see Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras 
v. Nicaragua), 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 192; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and 
Bahrain, 2001 I.C.J. Rep., para 303; Waste Management Inc v. Mexico (Mexico’s Preliminary Objection), 
ICSID, decision dated 26 June 2003, (2002) 41 ILM 1315, para 39; CME Czech Republic BV v. The Czech 
Republic, Final Award, 14 March 2003, para 435; Amco v. Indonesia (Resubmission: Jurisdiction) ICSID 
89 ILR 553, 560. See, generally, Filip de Ly and Audley Sheppard, ILA Interim Report on Res Judicata and 
Arbitration, 25 ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL 35 (2009) (U.K.).  
38 PETER BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 92–97 (Oxford University Press 
2001); SEAN WILKEN & KARIM GHALY, THE LAW OF WAIVER, VARIATION AND ESTOPPEL 319–321 (3d ed., 
Oxford University Press 2012).  
39 The position in most common law jurisdictions reflects that of England. In Australia for example, parties 
may plead both issue and cause of action estoppel in enforcement proceedings. There is also a parallel rule 
to that in Henderson v. Henderson (discussed below) which is instead commonly known as “Anshun 
Estoppel”: K.R. Handley, Res Judicata: General Principles and Recent Developments, 18 AUSTRALIAN 
BAR REVIEW 214 (1999). The doctrine is similarly extended to Canada: DONALD LANGE, THE DOCTRINE OF 
RES JUDICATA IN CANADA 376 (Ontario: LexisNexis 2004). The United States has taken a different 
conceptual approach to the issue, however the effects are similar. Res judicata may be invoked in the form 
of claim preclusion or issue preclusion. There is no doctrine of abuse of process akin to that in England. 
Claim preclusion, however, is interpreted broadly so as to encompass issues which should have been raised, 
as well as those which in fact did arise in the previous proceedings. In some respects this creates a similar 
effect to the rule in Henderson v. Henderson: Justine N Stefanelli, The Effect in the European Community 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters: Recognition, Res Judicata and Abuse of Process, REPORT 
ON USA 57. It has been said that the English common law doctrine of res judicata is “entirely consistent 
with […] the rule of the Civil law”: Nelson v. Couch (1863) 15 CB (NS) 99, 108 (Willes J) (Eng. and 
Wales).  
40 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd) [2013] UKSC 
46, [2013] 3 WLR 299, para 17 (Eng. and Wales).  
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the claim that the award is invalid because of the ground pleaded. Furthermore, the cause 
of action in enforcement proceedings in country A will not be the same as the cause of 
action in enforcement proceedings in country B as in country A the cause of action is the 
right to the enforcement of the award in country A whereas in country B the cause of 
action is the right to the enforcement of the award in country B.41 
 
However, inn England and Wales, and in many common law jurisdictions, the doctrine of 
res judicata encompasses the doctrine of issue estoppel. This doctrine was stated by Lord 
Sumption JSC in the following terms:42 
 
[...] even where the cause of action is not the same in the later action as it 
was in the earlier one, some issue which is necessarily common to both was 
decided on the earlier occasion and is binding on the parties. 
 
The doctrine of issue estoppel applies in a cross-border context.43 In Carl Zeiss,44 the 
House of Lords ruled that a West German judgment establishing who was the successor 
of the pre-war Carl Zeiss Foundation was capable of giving rise to an issue estoppel 
under English law provided that three conditions were fulfilled: (a) the judgment must be 
a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) the subject matter 
must be the same; (c) the parties must be the same. The third condition was not met on 
																																																								
41 This, of course, rather depends on the complex question of what exactly the cause of action is, a question 
that may have different answers in different jurisdictions. In the United States, for example, the concept of 
cause of action appears to be broad and, therefore, probably setting aside proceedings and enforcement 
proceedings in which the respondent resists enforcement may be said to have the same cause of action: 
Belmont Partners LLC v. Mina Mar Group Inc 741 F Supp 2d 743 (WDVa 2010). Ultimately, the 
conclusions of this article do not depend on the precise characterization of the preclusion as cause of action 
or issue estoppel.  
42 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd) [2013] UKSC 
46, [2013] 3 WLR 299 (Eng. and Wales).  
43 The question of which legal system will determine the preclusive effects of a foreign judgment has not 
been finally answered and divergent approaches can be found in different jurisdictions. Several theories 
have been put forward as to which law governs the effect of these judgments, which can be reduced 
essentially to four: (a) the judgment has only the effects that it has in the country of origin; (b) the judgment 
has only the effects it has in the country of recognition; (c) the judgment has all the effects it has in the 
country of origin and all the effects it has in the country of recognition; (d) the judgment has only the 
effects that it has in the country of origin that correspond to effects that it has in the country of recognition. 
The English courts have generally proceeded on the basis that a foreign judgment, once recognized, has the 
effects that an equivalent judgment would have under English law but bearing in mind that a foreign 
judgment cannot create a preclusion in England if it is not capable of doing so in the country of origin. See, 
further, S Harder, The effects of recognized foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters, 62 
INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 441(2013) (U.K.). The analysis and conclusions in this 
article do not depend on the solution to this problem. The question discussed here is whether and, if so, in 
what circumstances and with what exceptions, a judgment in setting aside or enforcement proceedings or 
failure to apply for the setting aside of the award or to resist enforcement abroad may prevent a party from 
raising an issue that could have been raised in the earlier proceedings in subsequent enforcement 
proceedings in a different country. Once this question has been answered, there arises the subsequent, 
logically separate issue of the law governing the preclusive effect.  
44 Carl Zeiss Stiftung Appellants v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd [1967] 1 AC 853 (HL) 919 (Eng. and Wales).  
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the facts but Carl Zeiss unequivocally established that issue estoppel applies to foreign 
judgments.  
 
The subsequent case of The Sennar dealt with a Dutch judgment which decided that a bill 
of lading contained an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favor of the courts of Khartoum. 
The House of Lords held that the decision of the Dutch court was a decision on the merits 
which estopped the claimants from arguing in England that the English courts had 
jurisdiction over the matter.45 The significance of this case for international arbitration is 
that it clarified that the doctrine of issue estoppel may apply to jurisdictional clauses and, 
therefore, also to foreign judgments on the existence, validity and scope of arbitration 
agreements. More generally, a foreign judgment on the validity of an arbitration award is 
capable of giving rise to issue estoppel. 
 
The doctrine of issue estoppel may prevent a party from re-opening an issue already 
determined in a final judgment on the merits of a court of competent jurisdiction between 
the same parties, their privies or successors in title. A final judgment by a court of 
supervisory jurisdiction at the seat of the arbitration clearly qualifies as a judgment giving 
rise to issue estoppel. Lord Collins JSC in Dallah commented, obiter, that a judgment by 
a court at the seat of the arbitration may, in certain circumstances, give rise to an estoppel 
or other preclusion.46 Even more clearly, Moore-Bick LJ in the court below said that a 
decision of the supervisory court may finally determine questions concerning the 
fundamental validity and integrity of an arbitral award and thereby itself create an 
estoppel by record.47 This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yukos v. Rosneft, 
where Rix LJ, giving the judgment of the Court, proceeded on the assumption that a 
judgment in foreign enforcement proceedings was capable of giving rise to an issue 
estoppel in England and Wales.48 If this is so in relation to foreign enforcement 
proceedings, it must a fortiori also apply to setting aside proceedings at the seat.  
 
This approach is not limited to English law. In Australia, in Blair v. Curran,49 the High 
Court held that “a judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or law 
disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the 
same parties or their privies.” This also applies to decisions of arbitral tribunals and 
foreign judgments. In Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v. Gujarat NRE Coke Limited,50 Foster J 
was of the firm view that a decision in the supervisory court creates an issue estoppel in 
subsequent enforcement proceedings as to whether the proceedings were conducted in 
breach of the principles of natural justice. In that case, Coeclerici had obtained an arbitral 
																																																								
45 DSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH v. Owners of The Sennar (The Sennar) [1985] 1 WLR 490 
(HL) (Eng. and Wales).  
46 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; [2011] 1 AC 763, para 98 (Eng. and Wales).  
47 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of 
Pakistan [2009] EWCA Civ 755, para 57 (Eng. and Wales).  
48 Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras 147–149.  
49 Blair v. Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464, 531 (Austl.). 
50 Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v. Gujarat NRE Coke Limited [2013] FCA 882 (Austl.). 
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award in its favor from a tribunal with its seat in London. The respondent, Gujarat, had 
sought to challenge the award under section 68 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 for 
procedural irregularity on the basis that it was not given a reasonable opportunity to 
present his case. The challenge was rejected.51 Gujarat subsequently sought to resist 
enforcement in Australia under the International Arbitration Act, section 8(5)(c), dealing 
with the party’s inability to present his case, and section 8(7)(b) and (7A)(b), dealing with 
breach of public policy and providing that a breach of natural justice is a breach of public 
policy. Foster J held that there was no material difference between section 68 of the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 and the Australian International Arbitration Act, despite the 
differing statutory frameworks. Furthermore, the facts relied upon were the same in both 
sets of proceedings. As such, he considered that the English judgment had decided the 
question of the alleged breach of natural justice and this gave rise to an issue estoppel. 
Foster J went on, stating that “even if there were no issue estoppel or res judicata, it 
would generally be inappropriate for this Court, being the enforcement court of a 
Convention country, to reach a different conclusion on the same question as that reached 
by the court of the seat of arbitration.”52 The judgment was unsuccessfully appealed.53 
The Full Court declined to decide the question of issue estoppel but agreed that in this 
case the issue was the same as that before the English courts. It also endorsed the 
approach of Foster J in the court below and of Colman J in Minmetals in saying that it 
will generally be inappropriate for the enforcement court to diverge from the view of the 
supervisory court on the same question of alleged procedural defect.54 Interestingly, under 
Australian law a breach of natural justice also fell under the category of breach of public 
policy. This did not, however, prevent Foster J from upholding an estoppel and the Full 
Court from stating that departure from the decision of the supervisory court would 
generally be inappropriate. 
 
The Israeli courts have taken a similar view to Foster J in the case of Israel No 1, Epis SA 
v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH.55 This case concerned an award made by a tribunal with its 
seat in Switzerland. The award debtor (“Medibar”) had unsuccessfully challenged the 
award in the Swiss federal courts on the grounds of breach of public policy. Medibar’s 
central argument was that a dispute between Medibar and the arbitrators in relation to 
their fees rendered the arbitrators unable to rule objectively and fairly. Therefore the 
award breached Swiss public policy. This argument was rejected and Medibar 
subsequently sought to resist enforcement in the Israeli courts on the same basis. Israeli 
law was similar to Swiss law in this area. The Jerusalem District Court stated that “it has 
been established more than once that a final judgment given in a foreign jurisdiction 
creates issue estoppel in relation to all the matters decided by the foreign court. The rule 
is that a foreign judgment may serve as the basis of issue estoppel if it would also lead to 
																																																								
51 Gujarat NRE Coke Ltd v. Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] EWHC 1987 (Comm) (Eng. and Wales).  
52 Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v. Gujarat NRE Coke Limited [2013] FCA 882, para 102 (Austl.).  
53 Gujarat NRE Coke Limited v. Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 109 (Austl.).  
54 Gujarat NRE Coke Limited v. Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 109, para 65 (Austl.).  
55Epis SA v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, Jerusalem District Court, 23 November 2004, (2006) 31 Y.B. 
COMM ARB 788.  
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such estoppel” in the place where it was handed down.56 The Court further stated that “it 
would not be reasonable to determine that this court is better able to examine the proper 
conduct of a foreign arbitral proceeding which was discussed and determined according 
to Swiss ZCC rules and Swiss procedure, than the Swiss courts.”57 As in Coeclerici, the 
issue was essentially one of natural justice even if it was pleaded as a breach of public 
policy.  
 
In the Indian case of International Investor KCSC v. Sanghi Polyesters Ltd,58 the award 
debtor resisted enforcement in India, having already unsuccessfully challenged the award 
in the courts of the seat in England and Wales under section 68 of the English Arbitration 
Act 1996, alleging that he had been denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. 
In considering this issue, the Andra Pradesh High Court held that, because the same 
submission had been rejected by the competent court which had the jurisdiction to set 
aside the award if it were convinced otherwise, “the respondent cannot raise the same 
issue again in the proceeding for the enforcement of the award on the principle of ‘res 
judicata’.”59 
 
Some courts do, however, struggle with the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel 
in enforcement proceedings. On one view, this should not be a cause of concern or 
surprise. The application of such a doctrine to preclude a party from resisting 
enforcement under Article V of the New York Convention is, after all, a matter of 
national law under Article VII of the Convention. States are entitled but not required to 
apply more favorable provisions than those in Article V to the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. And, more often than not, the formal rejection of the doctrine of issue 
estoppel does not mean that courts may not rely on broader principles, such as the 
discretionary standard under Article V or the principles of good faith, to achieve the same 
result through pretty much the same reasoning. An interesting example is the Hebei 
case.60 The unsuccessful party in the arbitration had challenged the award at the seat of 
the arbitration, in Beijing. The Beijing courts had rejected the challenge. The same party 
subsequently sought to resist enforcement in Hong Kong. Sir Anthony Mason NPJ61 
expressed the view “that it would be inconsistent with the principles on which the 
Convention is based to hold that the refusal of supervisory jurisdiction to set aside an 
award debars an unsuccessful applicant from resisting enforcement of the award in the 
court of enforcement.” 62  The reason was that, precisely because it provides that 
																																																								
56 Epis SA v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, Jerusalem District Court, 23 November 2004, (2006) 31 Y.B. 
COMM ARB 788.  
57 Id. 788. 
58 International Investor KCSC v. Sanghi Polyesters Ltd, High Court, Andhra Pradesh, Civil Revision 
Petition No 331 of 2002; Civil Revision Petition No 1441 of 2002, 9 September 2002, (2005) 30 Y.B. 
COMM ARB 577.  
59 Id. para 19.  
60 Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. COMM 
ARB 652 (Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region). 
61 Justices Litton PJ and Bokhari PJ gave concurring judgments essentially agreeing with the main gist of 
Sir Anthony Mason NPJ’s judgment. 
62 Id. paras 43 and 44. 
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enforcement of a foreign award may be refused on the grounds specified in Article V, the 
Convention must have envisaged that, although an award may be valid at the seat, it may 
be tainted by such a serious defect in the eyes of the enforcement court that the award 
should not be enforced.63 This is correct: the Convention allows a Contracting State to 
refuse enforcement of a foreign award which is valid at the seat if a ground under Article 
V is established. However, it does not compel a Contracting State to do so. The question 
is whether estoppel is an appropriate basis for enforcing an award notwithstanding a 
ground under Article V is or can be established. On this fundamental policy question, His 
Lordship’s view appears to have been influenced by two factors: (a) firstly, the 
application of the doctrine of issue estoppel would have required a “precise comparison” 
between the law of the People’s Republic of China and the law of Honk Kong to 
ascertain “whether the respective laws gave rise to identical or similar issue”;64 and, (b) 
secondly, the ground pleaded in the case was breach of public policy, even if the alleged 
breach consisted in the apparent bias of the chief arbitrator and in the inability of the 
award debtor to present his case.65 Neither factor is, however, persuasive. 
 
As regards the first factor, for the doctrine of issue estoppel to apply to a foreign 
judgment it is not necessary that the foreign legal regime must be exactly the same as the 
enforcement court’s legal framework. In fact, this is not what Sir Anthony Mason NPJ 
said. Were it otherwise, issue estoppel would hardly ever arise from a foreign judgment. 
What His Lordship was saying is that a detailed comparison was required to ascertain 
whether identical or similar issues were raised in the two sets of proceedings. The level of 
detail required in each case depends, of course, on all the circumstances and is probably a 
matter of degree but the analysis is functional: the court must be satisfied that the issue is 
the same not that the legal frameworks are the same. In Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd v. 
Gujarat NRE Coke Limited, the Australian Full Court of the Federal Court of Appeal had 
no problem in concluding, albeit obiter, that a serious irregularity issue under section 68 
of the English Arbitration Act 1996 was the same as an issue as to the party’s alleged 
inability to present his case under section 8(7)(b) and (7A)(b) of the Australian 
International Arbitration Act, notwithstanding the clear differences in the respective legal 
frameworks in England and Wales and in Australia.66 
 
As regards the second factor, it is undoubtedly true that each Contracting State is entitled 
to apply its own public policy, which may differ from the public policy of the State of the 
seat. In principle, therefore, there cannot be issue estoppel in relation to the public policy 
exception under Article V(II)(b) of the Convention because the issue arising in the two 
sets of proceedings is necessarily different. However, the matter may be different when 
the breach of public policy is dependent on the establishment of a procedural breach 
under Article V(1)(b) or (d) of the Convention. Whether such breaches, or a subset 
thereof, are a breach of public policy is a question that necessarily differs from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But whether there has been a procedural breach in the first 
																																																								
63 Id. para 43.  
64 Id. para 40.  
65 Id. para 46 (stating that “each jurisdiction has its own public policy”). 
66 Gujarat NRE Coke Limited v. Coeclerici Asia (Pte) Ltd [2013] FCAFC 109, para 62 (Austl.).  
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place is not an issue of public policy and is capable, therefore, of being the same in 
proceedings at the seat and before the enforcement court. Again, in Coeclerici Asia (Pte) 
Ltd v. Gujarat NRE Coke Limited, the ground pleaded was both the party’s alleged 
inability to present his case and a breach of public policy, based on the same facts. The 
Australian Full Court of the Federal Court of Appeal had no difficulty at all in coming to 
the view that the issue was the same before the English and the Australian courts.67 Nor 
did the Jerusalem District Court in Israel No 1, Epis SA v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH have 
any difficulty on precisely the same point.68 Sir Anthony Mason NPJ himself in Hebei 
recognized that when a procedural irregularity is pleaded as a breach of public policy, the 
respondent continues to bear the burden of proof notwithstanding the suggestion that, 
under Article V(II) of the Convention, the court can take the point own its own motion.69 
A procedural irregularity does not cease to be what it is because it also amounts to a 
breach of public policy in a particular jurisdiction. 
 
In any event, the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal allowed the appeal and ruled that the 
award should be enforced because, inter alia, the respondent had failed to raise one of the 
alleged procedural breaches in the arbitration, thus losing the right to rely on the breach 
later, based on broader principles of estoppel, good faith or the rule that non-compliance 
with the governing rules shall be raised promptly in the arbitration itself.70 Sir Anthony 
Mason NPJ also considered, obiter, that failure to raise an issue before the court of the 
seat would prevent the award debtor from relying on a procedural breach in enforcement 
proceedings71 while Justice Litton PJ said that “it would be an unusual case where [the 
court of the seat] has ruled in favor of the validity of the award, yet the court in the 
enforcement jurisdiction nevertheless concludes that enforcement should be denied for 
public policy reasons”.72 The Hebei case, therefore, does not contradict the possibility 
and desirability, in law and in policy, to apply the doctrine of issue estoppel in 
enforcement proceedings although it is probably authority for the proposition that, under 
Hong Kong law, a foreign judgment of the court at the seat of the arbitration does not 
give rise to an issue estoppel in enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong. 
 
In conclusion, there appear to be sound policy reasons for holding that a judgment 
rejecting a challenge to the award at the seat is capable is principle of giving rise to issue 
estoppel in enforcement proceedings. Whether this is so is a matter for the law of the 
enforcing court.  
 
 
D. Abuse of process 
																																																								
67 Id.  
68 Epis SA v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, Jerusalem District Court, 23 November 2004, (2006) 31 Y.B. 
COMM ARB 788. 
69 Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. COMM 
ARB 652 (Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), para 56.  
70 Id. paras 47–55. 
71 Id. para 54.  
72 Id. para 66. 
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The ability of the unsuccessful party to resist recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award under Article V of the New York Convention may be constrained by the 
general and inherent power of the court to prevent its process being abused. As Lord 
Diplock said in Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, this inherent 
power is one which any court of justice must possess “to prevent misuse of its procedure 
in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of its procedural 
rules, would nevertheless be manifestly unfair to a party to litigation before it, or would 
otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking 
people”.73 
 
The abuse of process doctrine is most commonly applied in circumstances in which there 
has been previous litigation between the same parties and one of them seeks to bring a 
claim or raise a defense in later proceedings which could and should have been raised in 
the earlier proceedings. In English law, this rule originates in Henderson v. Henderson.74 
In that case, a court in Newfoundland had ordered A, who had been in partnership with 
B, to pay C, B’s next of kin, sums due to him as beneficiary of B’s estate. In England, A 
sought to recover from C money allegedly due to him as a creditor of B’s estate. In a 
celebrated statement, Wigram V-C said that a party is precluded from raising in 
subsequent proceedings not only the points on which the court was actually required to 
rule but every point “which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the 
parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time”.75 The 
effect of this rule in enforcement proceedings is that, for instance, a judgment rejecting a 
challenge to the award at the seat for lack of jurisdiction also prevents the unsuccessful 
party from relying on a procedural breach under Article V(1)(b) or (d) of the New York 
Convention as a ground for resisting enforcement if this matter could have been raised in 
the setting aside proceedings. More generally, the party who lost a challenge to the 
arbitral award at the seat of the arbitration may be prevented from litigating under Article 
V of the New York Convention any issues that could have been raised in the proceedings 
at the seat.76 
 
The abuse of process doctrine may, however, be wider and apply in cases in which a 
party could have brought proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction and did not do 
so, electing to bring proceedings elsewhere at a later stage instead. Such an extension 
																																																								
73 Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529, 536 (Eng. and Wales).  
74 Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 (Eng. and Wales). The modern statement of the 
rule is found in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co (A Firm) [2000] UKHL 65; [2002] 2 AC 1 (Eng. and Wales). 
See also PETER BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 188–191 (Oxford 
University Press 2001); Gary Watt, The Danger and Deceit of the Rule in Henderson v. Henderson: A New 
Approach to Successive Civil Actions Arising from the Same Factual Matter, 19 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 
287 (2000) (U.K.); Gary Watt, Henderson is dead! Long live Henderson! – the Modern Rule of Abuse of 
Process, 20 CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY 90 (2001) (U.K.) and K.R. Handley, A Closer Look at Henderson v. 
Henderson, 118 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 397 (2002) (U.K.). 
75 Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, 114–115 (Eng. and Wales).  
76  See, e.g., H v. F in liquidation, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 4 January 2012, 9 Sch 02/09 and 
Bundesgerichtshof, III ZB 8/12, 20 December 2012, (2013) 38 Y.B. COMM ARB 379.  
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could be based on the words of Lord Bingham in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co (A 
Firm):77 
 
It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in 
earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in 
later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an 
approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits-based judgment 
which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also 
takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial 
question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is abusing or misusing 
the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could 
have been raised before.  
 
Failing to raise an issue may occur in two contexts. A party may have brought 
proceedings in which the issue could have been raised and failed to raise it. But a party 
may fail to bring proceedings altogether. In principle, there is no reason to treat these two 
types of conduct differently although in practice courts may be much more careful in 
upholding a preclusion based simply on failure to bring proceedings rather than on failure 
to raise an issue in proceedings which have actually been brought. Failure to bring 
proceedings altogether may be motivated by innumerable factors, some of which may be 
entirely justified. Inaction is, by its nature, ambiguous. It could be difficult for a court to 
determine, ex post and on the basis of conflicting evidence, whether, on the face of mere 
inaction, the award debtor is abusing the process of the court by raising later an issue that 
could have been raised before. This is probably the reason why courts appear to adhere to 
the proposition that the mere failure to challenge the award at the seat of the arbitration 
does not, without more, deprive the unsuccessful party of the right to resist recognition 
and enforcement of the award under Article V of the New York Convention. But this 
proposition is not absolute.  
 
Courts are particularly cautious when it comes to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. In 
Dallah, for example, Lord Collins JSC, agreeing with Moore-Bick LJ in the court below, 
said that “the failure by the resisting party to take steps to challenge the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal in the courts of the seat would rarely, if ever, be a ground for exercising the 
discretion in enforcing an award made without jurisdiction”. Thus his Lordship not only 
confined his statement to a challenge relating to jurisdiction but, even limited to that 
particular ground, he did not exclude the exercise of the discretion altogether.78 This 
approach was adopted in the South African case of Phoenix Shipping Corporation v. 
DHL Global Forwarding SA (Pty) Ltd.79 The proceedings, with seat in London, involved 
three parties, Phoenix, DHL and Bateman. An award was made in which DHL was liable 
to pay Phoenix, and furthermore Bateman was ordered to indemnify DHL for a portion of 
																																																								
77 Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co (A Firm) [2000] UKHL 65; [2002] 2 AC 1, 31 (Eng. and Wales).  
78 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; [2011] 1 AC 763, para 131 (Eng. and Wales).  
79 Phoenix Shipping Corporation v. DHL Global Forwarding SA (Pty) Ltd (High Court of South Africa, 
Western Cape Division) (2012) 37 Y.B. COMM ARB 290. 
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the award. Phoenix sought the enforcement of the award in South Africa. DHL sought 
leave to intervene as co-applicant in the proceedings in order to enforce the portion of the 
award in its favor against Bateman. Bateman resisted this relief on the basis that it was 
not a party to the arbitration agreement and therefore the tribunal had no jurisdiction.80 
Conversely, DHL argued that Bateman was estopped from raising the point of 
jurisdiction, since it did not challenge the award on this basis in the courts of the seat. 
The High Court of South Africa agreed with the judgment of the UK Supreme Court 
judgment in Dallah Real Estate that nothing in the New York Convention or in their 
respective domestic legislation contains “any suggestion that a party resisting recognition 
or enforcement of an award in any one country has an obligation to seek to set aside the 
award in the other country where the award was made.”81 On all the facts, including that 
Bateman had disputed the Tribunal’s jurisdiction throughout the proceedings, it was held 
that Bateman was not precluded from relying on this objection.  
 
However, cases in which lack of jurisdiction is pleaded may be distinguished from cases 
concerning a procedural breach. When it comes to procedural irregularities, the English 
courts have considered the failure by the party opposing recognition and enforcement to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the supervisory court a relevant factor in deciding whether to 
enforce an award under Article V of the New York Convention. In Minmetals, Colman J 
had to determine whether an award which was allegedly in breach of natural justice was 
against English public policy. The judge set out the following considerations as relevant 
to his decision: (a) the nature of the procedural injustice; (b) whether the party resisting 
enforcement has invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts at the seat of the 
arbitration; (c) whether a remedy was available under that jurisdiction; (d) whether the 
courts of that jurisdiction have conclusively determined the issue in favor of upholding 
the award; (e) if the party resisting enforcement has failed to invoke the remedial 
jurisdiction of the supervisory court, whether it was acting unreasonably in failing to do 
so.82 On the facts, the award was enforced on the ground that, inter alia, the defendant 
conducted itself unreasonably in the arbitration so as to deprive itself of its local remedies 
and to place itself “in exactly the same position in substance as if it had wholly ignored 
the availability of such remedies”.83 While the judge was weighing the relevant 
considerations on an application to refuse the enforcement of a foreign award under 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, namely, on the ground that the award was 
against public policy, the case was essentially one of procedural irregularity. 
 
Furthermore, cases in which a party fails to apply to the court altogether may be 
distinguished from cases in which a party initially issues proceedings to set aside the 
award and then discontinues them. In Sheltam Rail Co (Pty) Ltd v. Mirambo Holdings 
Ltd, the claimant issued proceedings under sections 67 and 68 of the English Arbitration 
Act 1996 to challenge a partial award. Before the claim was due to be heard, the claimant 
																																																								
80 Id. paras 5–7.  
81 Id. para 40.  
82 Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] CLC 647, 661 (Eng. and Wales).  
83 Id. 662.  
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issued a notice of discontinuance of the claim. The defendant applied to the court to set 
aside the notice of discontinuance as it was confident that it would defeat the claimant’s 
challenge of the partial award. Aikens J held that he had the power to set aside the notice 
if it was an abuse of process. The learned judge further noted that the claimant had 
decided to discontinue the claim rather than agreeing to its dismissal because it intended 
to preserve its ability to challenge the award if the defendants moved to enforce it in a 
New York Convention State. Therefore, the notice of discontinuance was allowed to 
stand only on the claimant’s undertaking not to challenge recognition and enforcement by 
the defendants on the grounds raised before the English court.84 The reason for this 
approach is that the judge considered that it would have been an abuse of process for the 
claimant to challenge the recognition and enforcement of the award under Article V of 
the New York Convention on the same grounds raised in the discontinued application to 
set aside the same award before the English court. While the claimant in this case did 
issue proceedings, the claim was never heard and there was no judgment. Still, a 
subsequent challenge in another state under Article V of the New York Convention could 
amount to an abuse of process in the eyes of the English court. The Singapore High Court 
judgment in Galsworthy Ltd of the Republic of Liberia v. Glory of Wealth Shipping Pte 
Ltd85 may be properly understood as an application of the same approach. In this case, the 
unsuccessful party in an arbitration (GWS) brought proceedings to challenge the award at 
the seat, in London. As part of these proceedings, Galsworthy obtained an order for 
security for costs. GWS did not provide security and the proceedings were dismissed, 
without a decision on the merits. Galsworthy subsequently sought enforcement in 
Singapore. A preliminary dispute arose as to whether GWS was entitled to apply to set 
aside the enforcement order. The Singapore High Court accepted Galsworthy’s argument 
that this would be an abuse of process. They noted, under the heading of “abuse of 
process”, that “GWS had opportunity in choosing either the supervisory or enforcement 
court to mount its challenge […] It elected their forum of challenge and they ought to be 
bound by it.”86 The Court went on to say that the principle of comity of nations requires 
courts to be slow to undermine an order made by other courts unless exceptional 
circumstances exist.87 
 
Internationally, a close relation of the doctrine of abuse of process is the principle of good 
faith. The litigation in Astro Nusantara, where the courts of Hong Kong and Singapore 
reached conflicting conclusions on whether a party who did not challenge an award on 
jurisdiction could later rely on lack of jurisdiction to resist enforcement of the same and 
																																																								
84 Sheltam Rail Co (Pty) Ltd v. Mirambo Holdings Ltd [2008] EWHC 829 (Comm) [2009] Bus LR 302 
(Eng. and Wales). 
85 Galsworthy Ltd of the Republic of Liberia v. Glory of Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 304 
(Singapore). 
86 Id. paras 5–6.  
87 Id. para 7. For a similar approach, see, e.g., IPOC International Growth Fund Ltd v. LV Finance Group 
Ltd, Civil Appeal No 30 of 2006 (British Virgin Islands Court of Appeal, 18 June 2007); International Inv 
KCSC v. Sanghi Polyesters Ltd (2005) 30 Y.B. COMM ARB 577 (Andhra Pradesh High Court 2002); Denis 
Coakley Ltd v. Sté Michel Reverdy (1984) 9 Y.B. COMM ARB 400 (Reims Cour d’appel). 
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subsequent awards on the merits, is an example in point.88 The arbitration proceedings 
arose out of a shareholders’ agreement relating to a joint venture for the provision of 
television services in Indonesia. Respondents had not challenged the award at the seat of 
arbitration in Singapore and the time limit for doing so expired. Nevertheless, they 
subsequently sought to resist enforcement in Singapore. The Singapore High Court 
initially dismissed their application, on the basis that, under the Singapore International 
Arbitration Act, 89 a setting aside application was an exclusive route to challenge a 
preliminary decision on jurisdiction.90 This was overturned by the Court of Appeal, who 
held that a setting aside application on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was not intended 
to be a “one-shot remedy” and that, in failing to challenge the award, respondents had not 
waived their right, nor were they estopped or otherwise precluded, from resisting 
enforcement in Singapore.91  
 
The same issue as to the jurisdiction of the tribunal was then raised before the courts of 
Hong Kong in enforcement proceedings.92 The Hong Kong High Court approached the 
question as one concerning the exercise of the discretion to enforce a foreign award as a 
matter of Hong Kong law.93 In the Court’s view, respondents decided “to defend the 
claim on the merits in the hope that [they] would succeed before the Tribunal, and keep 
the jurisdictional point in reserve to be deployed in the enforcement court only when it 
suited [their] interest to do so.” 94 As a consequence, the Court held that respondents were 
not permitted to resist enforcement because they had “acted in breach of the good faith, 
or bona fide, principle.”95 This was an application, or probably an extension, of an obiter 
dictum by Sir Anthony Mason NPJ in Hebei, where His Lordship said that failure to raise 
a point concerning the apparent bias of an arbitrator before the supervisory court at the 
seat was an additional ground to reach the conclusion that the aggrieved party could no 
longer rely on the objection in enforcement proceedings in Hong Kong.96 Though the 
whole judgment in Astro Nusantara can be read as an application of the principle of good 
faith under the New York Convention already recognized in Hebei, the same result, 
																																																								
88 Hong Kong: Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media TBK, HCCT 45/2010; Singapore: PT 
First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV [2013] SGCA 57.  
89 This is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(3). 
90 Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media [2012] SGHC 212, paras 199–222. 
91 PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV [2013] SGCA 57. This was, of course, a purely 
domestic law decision as the seat of the arbitration was in Singapore and the enforcement application was 
also in Singapore. However, the Singapore International Arbitration Act is based on the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on international commercial arbitration and the judgment of the Court of Appeal is, therefore, a 
clear example of the traditional approach, discussed in section B of this article, which considers that the 
unsuccessful party has an unfettered choice of remedies: it can either apply for the setting aside of the 
award or resist enforcement. Failure to avail itself of a setting aside application does not give rise to any 
preclusion.  
92 Astro Nusantara International BV v. PT First Media TBK, HCCT 45/2010. 
93 Id. para 90–91.  
94 Id. para 91.  
95 Id. para 91.  
96 Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek Engineering Company Limited (1999) 24 Y.B. COMM 
ARB 652 (Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region), para 54.  
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through pretty much the same reasoning, could have been reached by an application of 
the abuse of process doctrine.  
 
Doctrines such as abuse of rights or good faith or estoppel, all close relations to the 
doctrine of abuse of process, have been applied in civil law jurisdictions. In Spain, for 
example, it has been held that a failure to raise an objection as to the arbitrator’s 
impartiality in available annulment proceedings in France meant that the Spanish court 
was precluded from reviewing this issue. 97 In Germany, prior to the reform to German 
Arbitration Law, which entered into force in 1998, the case law consistently held that a 
party was precluded from resisting enforcement under the Article V of the New York 
Convention where he had not raised the same objections at the court of the seat. This 
proposition was based on the interpretation of § 1044 of the Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) 
in force at the time. 98  The 1998 arbitration reform replaced the previous domestic 
provision on enforcement by declaring the New York Convention applicable to the 
recognition and enforcement of all foreign awards.99 The question is, therefore, whether 
the previous rule on preclusion that applied under § 1044 ZPO could still apply under the 
New York Convention. In 2010, the Federal Supreme Court refused to apply any rule of 
preclusion in the context of a plea for lack of jurisdiction.100 The Court noted that nothing 
in domestic law or Article V “contains a reservation requiring that means of appeal must 
be pursued abroad against the arbitral award. Thus […] this objection cannot be 
dismissed for failure to pursue means of appeal to be filed abroad within a given time 
limit.”101 This did not, however, rule out the application of an abuse of process rule. The 
Court went on to state that “[w]e can agree with [the Claimant] that the principle of good 
faith is included in the international arbitration law triggered by s 1061(1) first sentence 
ZPO and includes a plea of abuse of process for contradictory behavior (venire contra 
factum proprium)”.102 However, the Federal Supreme Court applied the rule of preclusion 
in, where the ground pleaded was procedural irregularity.103 In this case H obtained an 
award against F in an arbitration with its seat in the United States. F did not commence 
proceedings to set aside the award and H sought to enforce the award in Germany. The 
																																																								
97  Spain No 72, MK2 SA v. Wide Pictures, SL, Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia, 127/11, 17 
November 2011. 
98 The issue is interesting: § 1044 was domestic law that, on its face, applied if there were no international 
conventions providing otherwise. However, § 1044 was in fact more favorable than the New York 
Convention in that it provided that an arbitral award that had become final in accordance with the law 
applicable to it was to be recognized in Germany. The case law had interpreted this provision as meaning 
that if the award had not been challenged in the State of origin, it could not be challenged in Germany 
either: Seller v. Buyer, Bundesgerichtshof [Supreme Court], Not Indicated, 26 April 1990. 
99 See now ZPO, § 1061(1), which provides that recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
shall be granted in accordance with the New York Convention. Thus Germany withdrew the reservation of 
reciprocity initially made and extended the application of the Convention to all foreign awards. This meant, 
somewhat bizarrely, that the more favorable national law until then set out in § 1044 was repealed.  
100 French Seller v. German Buyer, Oberlandesgericht Munich, 23 November 2009 and French Seller v. 
German Buyer, Bundesgerichtshof, 16 December 2010, (2011) 36 Y.B. COMM ARB 273. 
101 Id. para 25.  
102 Id. paras 34–35. 
103 H v. F in liquidation, Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, 4 January 2012, 9 Sch 02/09 and Bundesgerichtshof, 
III ZB 8/12, 20 December 2012, (2013) 38 Y.B. COMM ARB 379. 
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Court cited the case law supporting the proposition that the debtor is precluded from 
invoking grounds for refusal of recognition “because it failed to rely on them timeously 
in an annulment action” in the courts of the seat.104 The Court distinguished this case 
from the 2010 decision discussed above, on several points. Firstly, the party in this case 
had not previously raised the objection in the arbitration proceedings. Secondly, the party 
in this case is citing procedural defects whereas in the previous decision, they were 
disputing the validity of the arbitration agreement. Furthermore, the claimant in this 
instance had no reason to expect the defendant to resist enforcement, on the basis of the 
defendant’s prior behavior.105 It appears that, in all the circumstances, this was sufficient 
to preclude the party from raising these objections at the enforcement stage.  
 
 
E. Issue estoppel and abuse of process arising from previous enforcement 
proceedings 
 
The role of the court at the seat of the arbitration is different from that of a court in 
enforcement proceedings. The court at the seat has supervisory jurisdiction in that it can 
entertain an application to set aside the award. If the award is set aside, the parties are no 
longer bound by it. The arbitrators cease to be functi officio and, depending on the 
ground on which the award was set aside, fresh proceedings may start to determine the 
same dispute that was not validly determined in the previous arbitration. The setting aside 
of the award provides the successful applicant with a ground to oppose enforcement 
under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention. An enforcement court has a more 
limited role: it determines whether the award should be enforced in its jurisdiction. If the 
respondent establishes a ground for refusal under Article V of the Convention, the 
enforcement court may refuse to enforce the award but the award continues to be legally 
binding on the parties. The arbitrators continue to be functi officio and, generally 
speaking, new arbitral proceedings cannot start afresh.106 Article V of the New York 
Convention is silent on the effect of a decision not to enforce the award in further 
enforcement proceedings and the natural inference must, therefore, be that such a 
decision, unlike a judgment setting aside the award, is no ground for refusing 
enforcement in other jurisdictions. However, as a matter of domestic law, in principle, 
issue estoppel may arise from a judgment of an enforcement court. The question is 
whether this is permissible under the New York Convention and, if so, in what 
circumstances.107 
																																																								
104 Id. para 3. 
105 Id. paras 11–14.  
106 Except, possibly, in the very State where enforcement was denied.  
107 Some argue that a judgment in enforcement proceedings should never have a preclusive effect because: 
(a) to do so would let the procedural timetable determine the issue; (b) it would not be right to let a foreign 
court decide the issue of enforcement of a foreign award within the jurisdiction: Maxi Scherer, Effects of 
International Judgments Relating to Awards, 43 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 637, 643–646 (2016). These 
arguments are, of course, arguments against estoppel arising from foreign judgments in general: any 
estoppel is based on a rule of priority (the earlier judgment prevails) and any estoppel precludes a court 
from deciding an issue that would otherwise be for the court to decide. This article argues that estoppel is, 
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It appears that a distinction should be drawn between previous judgments that enforce the 
award and previous judgments that refuse to enforce the award or, perhaps, more 
correctly, cases in which the estoppel operates in favor of enforcement (generally the 
previous judgment will therefore be a judgment enforcing the award) and cases in which 
the estoppel operates against granting enforcement (generally the previous judgment will 
therefore be a judgment refusing to enforce the award). The former category of case 
ought to be uncontroversial. The New York Convention allows the enforcing court to 
enforce the award even if a ground for refusal is established, including by applying more 
favorable national law provisions. There is no reason why national courts could not apply 
the principle of estoppel to preclude the party resisting enforcement to rely on a ground 
that has already been rejected by a foreign court in enforcement proceedings. More 
problematic are those cases where estoppel operates to establish a ground for refusing 
enforcement. This raises particular difficulties because, even if it is clear that there is 
discretion under the New York Convention to enforce an award notwithstanding a ground 
for refusal, the opposite is not true. There is no power to refuse enforcement if no ground 
under Article V has been established. And under Article VII national provisions can only 
apply if they are more favorable to the enforcement of the award, not if they lead to a 
refusal of enforcement.  
 
The English Commercial Court directly considered this issue in Diag Human SE v. Czech 
Republic.108 An arbitral tribunal, with its seat in the Czech Republic, made an award in 
favor of Diag Human SE (“Diag”). Diag first sought to enforce the award in Austria. The 
Czech Republic resisted enforcement on the basis that the award was not final and 
binding, as it was subject to an arbitral appeal process. The Austrian Supreme Court 
accepted this argument and refused enforcement of the award. Subsequent enforcement 
proceedings were brought in England. The question was whether the decision of the 
Austrian Supreme Court gave rise to an issue estoppel, precluding Diag from enforcing 
the award in England. In his judgment, Eder J held that where a foreign court decided that 
an award was not binding, there was no reason in principle why that decision should not 
give rise to an issue estoppel between the parties provided that the other conditions for an 
issue estoppel applied. In particular, provided that the issue was the same and that the 
decision could properly be said to be “on the merits”, it did not matter that the decision 
was made in enforcement proceedings as opposed to any other type of proceedings.109 
 
The notion that a previous enforcement judgment may give rise to issue estoppel was 
accepted obiter in the earlier English case of Chantiers De L’Atlantique SA v. 
Gaztransport & Technigaz SAS.110 The proceedings were conducted pursuant to the ICC 
rules, in Paris, in French and with French arbitrators and counsel. The arbitration 
																																																																																																																																																																					
in principle and as a matter of policy, desirable. The question is in what circumstances it should apply and 
under what conditions.  
108 Diag Human SE v. Czech Republic [2014] EWHC 1639 (Comm) (Eng. and Wales). 
109 Id. para 59.  
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agreement, however, provided that the seat of the arbitration was London and therefore 
annulment proceedings had to be brought in England. The arbitral tribunal had dismissed 
all claims and the successful respondent sought to have the award recognized and 
enforced in France. The unsuccessful party resisted enforcement, arguing that the award 
had been obtained by fraud. This argument was dismissed in France and the award was 
held to be enforceable. In the annulment proceedings in England, Flaux J first considered 
and dismissed the arguments of fraud on their merits. Obiter His Lordship noted that 
regardless of his conclusion, the decision in the French enforcement proceedings on what 
was materially the same issue would give rise to an issue estoppel which prevented the 
unsuccessful party from raising the allegations of fraud in subsequent proceedings.111 
Flaux J’s obiter in Chantiers De L’Atlantique is correct on the facts because the French 
judgment rejected an argument that the award was obtained by fraud. Estoppel, therefore, 
worked in favor not against enforcement and this is allowed both under the discretionary 
Article V standard and by way of application of more favorable national provisions under 
Article VII. In Yukos v Rosneft, Rix LJ, giving the judgment of the Court, appeared to 
accept, implicitly, that issue estoppel could apply to a foreign judgment in enforcement 
proceedings. 112  He was also correct because issue estoppel in that case would have 
deprived the award debtor of the possibility of relying on the setting aside of the award as 
a ground for opposing enforcement. In Diag Human, however, estoppel worked against 
enforcement. The application of English domestic law was, therefore, not permitted under 
the Convention as it led the court to refuse enforcement even if no ground under Article 
V has been established. 
 
Against the unidirectional application of the doctrine of issue estoppel advocated here, an 
argument could be made that the doctrine of issue estoppel does not introduce any 
additional ground for refusal into the New York Convention: estoppel operates to 
preclude a party to deny the existence of certain facts or legal consequences. The ground 
for refusal is and remains that the award has not yet become binding. Estoppel operates to 
determine whether, as a matter of law, that fact exists or not. However, there must be a 
serious doubt as to whether this interpretation is compatible with the pro-enforcement 
bias of the New York Convention and the generally accepted principle that the grounds 
for refusal under Article V must be interpreted narrowly. Furthermore, this interpretation 
is also inconsistent with the text of Article V, which explicitly sets out the only instance 
in which a decision of a foreign “competent authority” operates as a ground for refusing 
enforcement: this is the decision by a competent authority in the country in which, or 
under the law of which, the award was made to set aside the award. If the New York 
Convention had intended to allow other judgments in other proceedings to operate as a 
bar to enforcement it would, therefore, have stated this clearly. The fact that only the 
decision of the court of the seat setting aside the award is set out as a ground for refusal is 
a clear indication, or perhaps conclusive proof, that other judgments by other courts in 
other types of proceedings cannot have the same effect. Against this conclusion, some 
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argue that estoppel is an element of public policy, and is thus allowed for under Article 
V(2)(b) of the Convention.113 Obviously, whether estoppel is an element of public policy 
depends on the law of each jurisdiction. Generally speaking, however, the principle that 
an issue decided by a foreign court is binding before the domestic courts does not belong 
to those fundamental notions of justice and morality that constitute public policy.114 It is a 
useful rule to achieve consistency and efficiency in dispute resolution in an ever more 
intertwined and global world. Such a rule, however, is clearly one of those provisions that 
may or may not be applied without engaging the most fundamental interests of the State.  
 
It is important to note that the argument based on Articles V and VII of the Convention 
were not made before Eder J. The only legal arguments advanced to defeat issue estoppel 
were that estoppel could not arise from a judgment in enforcement proceedings and that 
there was no estoppel in the circumstances of the case. The latter argument was rightly 
rejected on the facts. The former argument was rightly rejected as a matter of law. There 
is nothing in English law or in the New York Convention (although the Convention was 
not discussed in Diag Human) that provides that a judgment by an enforcing court cannot 
give rise to issue estoppel if this works in favor of enforcement. So it appears that Eder 
J’s judgment was given without the benefit of full arguments on the proper construction 
of section 103 of the Arbitration Act 1996 in light of the principles of the New York 
Convention. As such, His Lordship reached the right conclusion on the arguments and 
facts before him but not one that can be of general application. Perhaps wisely in a later 
case Walker J declined to comment obiter on such complex and yet important issue.115 
 
Guidance on this issue in other jurisdictions is sparse. In the United States, the Draft U.S. 
Restatement on International Arbitration says that, in post award proceedings, U.S. courts 
must determine whether they “may re-examine a matter decided at an earlier stage of the 
proceedings [. . .] by a foreign court” by applying regular principles applicable to foreign 
judgments, including those of issue and claim preclusion.116 In Belmont Partners LLC v. 
Mina Mar Group Inc,117 after the award was made in proceedings seated in the United 
States, two separate proceedings commenced – one in Ontario, for the enforcement of the 
																																																								
113 K S Harisankar, Annulment versus Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Does the New York 
Convention Permit Issue Estoppel?, 18 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAW REVIEW 47, 52 (2015) (U.K.).  
114 It is trite that the public policy must be given a narrow interpretation: see, in the United States Parsons & 
Whittemore Overseas Co v. Société Générale de l’Industrie du Papier 508 F2d 969 (2d Cir 1974); Karaha 
Bodas Co LLC v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Das Gas Bumi Negara 364 F 3d 274 (5° Cir 2004); in 
England and Wales Deutsche Schachtbau v. Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 295 (CA); 
Westacre Investments Inc v. Jugoimport SPDR Holding Co Ltd [1999] 3 WLR 811 (CA). 
115 It bears quoting Walker J’s statement in full: “In my view the issues which would or might fall for 
consideration on those matters are not necessarily straightforward, and are best left to be dealt with in a 
context where they would be determinative of the outcome.” Malicorp Limited v. Government of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, Egyptian Holding Company for Aviation, Egyptian Airports Company [2015] EWHC 
361 (Comm), para 43 (Eng. and Wales).  
116  The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third), The U.S. Law of International 
Commercial Arbitration, Tentative Draft no 2 (April 2012) ss 4–8; Maxi Schrerer, Effects of Foreign 
Judgments Relating to International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment Route’ the Wrong Road?, 4 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 587, 593 (2013) (U.K.).  
117 Belmont Partners LLC v. Mina Mar Group Inc 741 FSupp2d 743 (WDVa 2010). 
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award under the New York Convention, in which Mina Mar applied for a variation of the 
award, and one in the District Court for the Western District of Virginia, for confirmation 
of the award on the application of Belmont in which Mina Mar applied for the setting 
aside of the award.118 The Ontario Superior Court denied Mina Mar’s application to vary 
the award and confirmed the award. The question was raised before the U.S. Court of 
Virginia whether the judgment of the Ontario court precluded Mina Mar’s claim for relief 
in the United States. In the view of the Court, “the Ontario Superior Court’s judgment 
can have preclusive effect if it meets the three prongs of the res judicata test.” Applying 
the rules of res judicata and comity, the District Court determined that “claim preclusion 
bars this Court from deciding whether to modify or vacate the Award”.119  
 
Finally, failure to oppose enforcement in State A by mere inaction should not, generally, 
preclude the award debtor to oppose enforcement in State B on grounds that he could 
have raised in State A. Failure to oppose enforcement may be motivated by several 
justifiable considerations, including the decision not to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
enforcing court or the absence of assets within the jurisdiction. A general rule that the 
award debtor would have to resist enforcement wherever it is sought could also lead to 
abuses if the award creditor chooses a friendly jurisdiction for the sole purpose of 
creating a preclusion. 
 
 
F. A Gloss on Corrective Mechanisms 
 
Finally, a brief gloss on the principle, which is sometimes stated, that the doctrines of 
issue estoppel and abuse of process can be applied flexibly so as to achieve justice rather 
than injustice. This principle does not mean that these doctrines are simply the exercise of 
unstructured discretions. It means that, in certain circumstances, notwithstanding the 
conditions for the application of these doctrines appear to be met, the courts may decide 
to allow a party to re-litigate the issue that would otherwise be precluded. A 
comprehensive analysis of the corrective mechanisms that the courts could deploy to 
achieve avoid injustice would render this article unbearably long. The following 
considerations are illustrative of the flexibility built into the system. 
 
Firstly, for a judgment to have a preclusive effect in a jurisdiction, it must be recognized 
in that jurisdiction.120 There are grounds on which a court will not recognize a foreign 
																																																								
118 Id. paras 1–5.  
119 Id. paras 15–19.  
120 Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in setting aside and enforcement proceedings is not 
governed by the European regime under Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L351/1 (“Brussels I 
Regulation (Recast)”): Brussels I Regulation (Recast), recital 12, para 4, and Art 1(2)(d). Therefore, either 
the statutory regime in force for certain Commonwealth countries (Administration of Justice Act 1920 and 
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933) or the common law applies (the conditions for the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment at common law are set out, with admirable brevity and 
clarity, by Arden LJ in Joint Stock Company (Aeroflot-Russian Airlines) v. Berezovsky [2014] EWCA Civ 
20, para 2 (Eng. and Wales)).  
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judgment. In England and Wales, a foreign judgment in setting aside or enforcement 
proceedings will not be recognized at common law if it was obtained by fraud, if it is in 
breach of English public policy, or if it is in breach if natural justice.121 This is already a 
significant safeguard against an abuse of the issue estoppel or abuse of process in 
enforcement proceedings.  
 
Secondly, even when a judgment has been recognized, issue estoppel may not apply. 
Lord Wilberforce in Carl Zeiss referred to the need for caution when recognizing the 
issue estoppel effect of foreign judgments.122 In a similar vein, Lord Upjohn said that 
estoppels must be applied so as to work justice and not injustice.123 In Arnold v. National 
Westminster Bank, the House of Lords recognized that the doctrine of issue estoppel is 
not absolute. There may be special circumstances in which the estoppel does not operate. 
In Arnold, a special circumstance was held to arise where further material became 
available which was relevant to the correct determination of a point involved in earlier 
proceedings, whether or not the point had been expressly raised and decided, but could 
not, by reasonable diligence, have been brought forward in those proceedings. Such 
further material was not confined to matters of fact but extended to issues of law. In that 
case, the judge in the earlier proceedings had made a mistake and a higher court had since 
overruled him. Therefore, the party who suffered from the mistake was not prevented 
from re-opening that issue when it arose in later proceedings.124 There is no difficulty to 
apply this principle in cases where, for example, further material comes to light after the 
conclusion of the previous setting aside or enforcement proceedings or the time limits for 
the bringing of such proceedings which the relevant party could not, by reasonable 
diligence, have discovered before.125 There is, however, no closed catalog of "special 
circumstances". Rix LJ would have applied the exception in Yukos v. Rosneft to allow the 
English courts to look afresh at the issue as to whether the Russian courts were partial 
and dependent on the basis that comity required that such an important question should 
be decided by the English courts afresh and should not be determined by an issue 
estoppel arising from a Dutch judgment.126  
 
Finally, the abuse of process doctrine is by its very nature a broad and flexible merits-
based test. This is perfectly compatible with the discretion under Article V of the New 
																																																								
121	JSC VTB Bank v. Skurikhin and others [2014] EWHC 271 (Comm), para 20, per Simon J (Eng. and 
Wales). The fourth exception, which applies if the judgment is for a fine or other penalty, would generally 
not relevant to judgments in setting aside or enforcement proceedings. 	
122	Carl Zeiss Stiftung Appellants v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd [1967] 1 AC 853 (HL) 919, 967 (Eng. and 
Wales).	
123 Id. 947.  
124 Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Plc [1991] 2 AC 93 (HL) (Eng. and Wales).  
125 This exception is specifically allowed in Arnold, which is not limited to subsequent changes in the law 
but applies to all "further material relevant to the correct determination of a point involved in the earlier 
proceedings, whether or not that point was specifically raised and decided, being material which could not 
by reasonable diligence have been adduced in those proceedings": id. 109, per Lord Keith of Kinkel, with 
whom Lord Griffiths, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle agreed (Lord Lowry giving a 
short concurring speech). 
126 Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co (No 2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855, paras 157–160.  
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York Convention and civil law doctrines such as abuse of rights or good faith. All the 
defenses to the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment as well as the special 
circumstances that would constitute an exception to the issue estoppel are certainly 
capable of being considered when a court applies the abuse of process doctrine. Indeed, 
the merits-based test goes further and allows the court to take into consideration of the 
circumstances of the case to determine whether to raise an issue that could have been 





This article explored the relationship between setting aside proceedings and enforcement 
proceedings and the relationship between two or more sets of enforcement proceedings to 
examine whether the award debtor may be precluded from raising in later proceedings 
grounds of attack on the award that it could have raised earlier. The main conclusions are 
the following: 
 
1. The New York Convention does not require that recognition and enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award be refused if one of the grounds in Article V is established. 
Contracting States are free to recognize and enforce arbitral awards even in the presence 
of one of the grounds in Article V. They may also apply more favorable national law 
provisions under Article VII of the Convention. Contracting States may, in particular, 
apply the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process to prevent the award debtor 
from relying on a ground for opposing enforcement that could have been raised in earlier 
proceedings. Whether this preclusion applies depends on the nature of the earlier 
proceedings and the nature of the ground relied upon. 
 
2. When a court at the seat of the arbitration has dismissed a challenge against the award, 
under the doctrine of issue estoppel the unsuccessful party should generally be prevented 
from re-litigating issues that have been determined by the court at the seat. All grounds 
for refusal except public policy may in principle be precluded. 
 
3. When a court at the seat of the arbitration has dismissed a challenge against the award, 
the rule in Henderson v Henderson may prevent the unsuccessful party from resisting 
enforcement on grounds that could have been raised, but were not raised, in proceedings 
at the seat of the arbitration. All grounds for refusal except public policy may in principle 
be precluded. 
 
4. As a general rule, a party is not required to challenge the award at the seat and failure 
to do so, without more, does not automatically prevent a party from resisting enforcement 
on any of the grounds in Article V of the New York Convention. However, this 
proposition is not absolute. It should apply, as a general rule, if the objection is one of 
jurisdiction. Assuming that the objection may be well founded, it seems reasonable to 
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allow the relevant party to choose whether to seek a remedy against the award at the seat 
or to oppose enforcement elsewhere. However, if the objection relates to a procedural 
irregularity, in exercising their discretion under Article V, courts can take into 
consideration whether the party resisting enforcement should have availed itself of the 
remedies available at the seat of the arbitration and whether failure to have done so was 
unreasonable in the circumstances of the case applying a broad merits-based test as 
required by the doctrine of abuse of process or similar doctrines of good faith or abuse of 
rights. In the exercise of discretion, it would be material whether the party opposing 
enforcement failed to raise any challenge altogether or discontinued a challenge that it 
initially brought. In the latter case, the exercise of discretion will lean more heavily 
towards enforcing the award. Once again, no preclusion should apply to public policy 
objections.  
 
5. Where a court of competent jurisdiction has made a judgment in previous enforcement 
proceedings, the doctrine of issue estoppel may apply to prevent the relevant party from 
relying on a ground for opposing enforcement but not to establish one such ground. The 
estoppel is unidirectional. Once again, no estoppel should arise in relation to public 
policy issues. 
 
6. Failure to oppose enforcement of the award should not, without more, give rise to any 
preclusion or be relevant to the exercise of the discretion to enforce an award under 
Article V of the New York Convention. 
 
7. An issue of public policy under Article V(II)(b) of the New York Convention will 
generally be determined by the court of the enforcement State because public policy may 
be different in each State. Therefore, an issue of public policy in State A is not the same 
as an issue of public policy in State B. However, there may be discrete issues relevant to 
the determination of the public policy question that may be the same in two jurisdictions. 
For example, when a procedural irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings is also 
considered a breach of public policy in the enforcement State, the question as to whether 
the procedural irregularity occurred may well be the same issue that was decided or could 
have been decided by a foreign court. On the other hand, whether and to what extent the 
procedural breach, if established, is a breach of public policy that may lead to the award 
being refused enforcement is an issue for the enforcement court on which a foreign 
judgment cannot give rise to an issue estoppel. 
 
8. There are corrective mechanisms that allow courts to depart from a strict application of 
the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process when to do so would clearly lead to 
injustice rather than serve the ends of consistency and finality in dispute resolution.  
 
The possibility that a party may be estopped from opposing recognition and enforcement 
of an arbitral award under Article V of the New York Convention on grounds that it 
raised, or could have raised, before the court of the seat or in previous enforcement 
proceedings goes some way towards achieving more consistency in international 
commercial arbitration and limiting inefficient and unfair forum shopping. Ultimately, 
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increased consistency would also require increased convergence in the application of 
national rules on res judicata, issue estoppel and abuse of process or similar doctrines, 
including, in particular, good faith and estoppel (nemo audit venire contra factum 
proprium), to buttress the finality and effectiveness of international arbitral awards.  
